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ABSTRACT 
Recent international tax reforms provide an advantage to non-
tax subsidies over economically equivalent tax benefits.  Under 
several international tax standards, multinational enterprises are 
generally better off when they receive non-tax subsidies instead of 
equivalent tax benefits.  As a result, countries now have a stronger 
incentive to adopt non-tax subsidies in order to attract the 
investment of multinational enterprises.  This tax-driven preference 
for non-tax subsidies could shape the landscape of international tax 
and subsidy competition in the future.  This Article contends that 
this preference cannot be justified on policy grounds.  To treat 
equivalent measures similarly, this Article proposes several changes 
in the international tax standards, as well as the design of the 
OECD’s recent proposal for a global minimum tax.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent international tax reforms try to curb certain forms of 
international tax competition.1  The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”)’s project on base erosion and 
profit shifting (“BEPS”) targets measures and practices that enable 
multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) to shift profits to jurisdictions 
where they pay little or no tax on that income. 2   Over 135 
jurisdictions have committed to implementing the BEPS minimum 
standards.3  Since late 2017, the EU has been blacklisting countries 
that do not meet certain international and EU tax standards.4  Most 
 
 1 There is extensive literature concerning tax competition.  See, e.g., Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000); Richard Collier & Giorgia Maffini, Tax Competition, Tax 
Co-operation and BEPS, 3 J. TAX ADMIN. 22 (2017); TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX 
POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (2018); David C. Elkins, The Merits 
of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L.J. 905 (2016); Lilian V. Faulhaber, 
The Trouble with Tax Competition: From Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. 311 (2018); 
Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and 
Coordination, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 257 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj 
Chetty, Martin Feldstein & Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013); Yoram Margalioth, Tax 
Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System To Promote 
Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161 (2003); Jeffrey Owens, The David H. 
Tillinghast Lecture Tax Competition: To Welcome or Not?, 65 TAX L. REV. 173 (2012); 
Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty 
in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555 (2009); Julie Roin, Competition and 
Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001); 
Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I), 1 
WORLD TAX J. 67 (2009). 
 2 For extensive literature on the BEPS project, see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
& Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal 
for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185 (2016); Rifat Azam, Ruling the World: 
Generating International Tax Norms in the Era of Globalization and BEPS, 50 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 517 (2017); Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 973 (2016); Irene Burgers & Irma Mosquera, Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A Fair 
Slice for Developing Countries?, 10 ERASMUS L. REV. 29 (2017); Allison Christians, 
BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1603 (2016); Arthur J. 
Cockfield, Shaping International Tax Law and Policy in Challenging Times, 54 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 223 (2018); Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax 
Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2017); WU INST. FOR AUSTRIAN AND INT’L TAX L., 
IMPLEMENTING KEY BEPS ACTIONS: WHERE DO WE STAND? (Michael Lang et al. eds., 
2019); Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353 
(2020). 
 3 See OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT 
JULY 2019 – JULY 2020, at 2-3 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-g20-
inclusive-framework-on-beps-progress-report-july-2019-july-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4V9M-MSAW]. 
 4 See discussion infra Section IV.b. 
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recently, the OECD has been developing a proposal for a global 
minimum tax.5 
These reforms provide an advantage to non-tax subsidies over 
economically equivalent tax benefits.  This Article analyzes the tax 
policy implications of this preference for non-tax subsidies.  This is 
an important fiscal policy matter for many countries, as many 
jurisdictions compete over MNE investment by granting tax and 
non-tax incentives.6 
Part III of this Article shows how three BEPS standards lead to 
the result that MNEs are generally better off when they receive non-
tax subsidies rather than the equivalent tax benefits.  First, a country-
by-country (“CbC”) report would show higher taxes paid and 
accrued where the MNE pays tax on its income and receives a 
subsidy equal to the tax.7  The CbC report would show lower taxes 
paid and accrued where the MNE receives a tax benefit and 
generates income subject to no or low tax.  Consequently, where the 
MNE receives a non-tax subsidy, its risk of being targeted by other 
countries’ tax authorities for profit shifting would be lower.  Second, 
countries that implement BEPS must exchange certain tax rulings, 
whereas the exchange of information regarding equivalent non-tax 
subsidies is not required.8  Third, under the BEPS recommendations 
for controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) rules, a CFC that receives 
a non-tax subsidy and pays tax is more likely to be exempted from 
the CFC rules because it is subject to a higher effective tax rate.9  A 
parent company of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays 
tax on its income should be able to claim a tax credit for the amount 
of tax the CFC has paid, whereas no tax credit can be claimed if the 
CFC receives a tax benefit and does not pay tax.10 
 
 5 See OECD, GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL (“GLOBE”) - PILLAR TWO, 
¶¶ 34-39 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-
global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RHS-
B6V7]. 
 6 See discussion infra Part II. 
 7 See discussion infra Section III.a. 
 8 See discussion infra Section III.b.  These two standards—CbC reporting and 
spontaneous exchange of tax rulings—are part of the minimum standards under 
BEPS.  OECD, supra note 3, at 14-17.  All members of the Inclusive Framework must 
implement these standards.  See OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS 
REPORT JULY 2016 - JUNE 2017, at 7 (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-BEPS-progress-report-
july-2016-june-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8UA-K69R].   
 9 See discussion infra Section III.c. 
 10 See discussion infra Section III.c. 
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The OECD’s recent proposal for a global minimum tax—titled 
by the OECD as the Global Anti-Base Erosion (“GloBE”) proposal—
has the potential to further increase the advantage of non-tax 
subsidies over equivalent tax benefits.11  Similar to CFC rules, the 
proposed rules under the GloBE regime would generally impose 
lower taxes where a subsidiary receives a non-tax subsidy and pays 
tax on its income instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit and 
paying no or low tax.  The carve-outs in the OECD proposal, which 
are limited to a modest return on expenditures on payroll and 
tangible assets, might not fully exclude income benefitting from 
non-harmful tax incentive regimes.  Therefore, the proposed GloBE 
regime would further reduce the benefit of non-harmful tax 
subsidies and increase the preference for equivalent non-tax 
subsidies. 
Countries now have stronger incentives to adopt non-tax 
subsidies over tax benefits to attract MNE investment, as discussed 
in Part IV.  As MNEs generally prefer non-tax subsidies over tax 
benefits, countries can attract more MNE investment at the same 
economic cost by granting non-tax subsidies instead of equivalent 
tax benefits.  In addition, countries are now scrutinized by the OECD 
and the EU for their preferential tax regimes.  A country that 
provides tax benefits is at risk of being accused of engaging in 
harmful tax competition by the OECD,12 or of being blacklisted as a 
“non-cooperative tax jurisdiction” by the EU.13  For example, South 
Korea was blacklisted by the EU in late 2017 for granting tax benefits 
to foreign investors.14  These risks can be reduced by offering non-
tax subsidies instead of tax benefits.  The incentive for countries to 
move from international tax competition to international subsidy 
competition could shape the way countries compete for MNE 
investment in the future. 
What are the implications of this tax-driven preference for non-
tax subsidies?  This Article argues that the preference for non-tax 
subsidies over equivalent tax subsidies might result in welfare 
losses.  Treating equivalent non-harmful tax subsidies and non-tax 
 
 11 OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX 
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 26-29 (2019), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-s
olution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LC2E-GEUG]; see also discussion infra Section III.d. 
 12 See discussion infra Section IV.a. 
 13 See discussion infra Section IV.b. 
 14 Id. 
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subsidies differently could result in suboptimal governmental 
policies.  Following David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, the choice 
between an equivalent tax expenditure and a spending program 
should depend on which agency would optimally administer the 
scheme.15  The tax-driven preference for non-tax subsidies might 
result in deadweight losses where the optimal instrument is a tax 
incentive scheme.  In addition, welfare losses may occur where non-
harmful tax benefits which increase welfare cannot be replaced with 
equivalent non-tax subsidies, or where they can be replaced but at a 
high cost.  There is an additional risk that some countries might 
replace certain harmful tax subsidies with equivalent harmful non-
tax subsidies.  This could be the case where a country grants a 
subsidy designed to offset the recipients’ tax liability with no 
substance requirement.  In addition, while the EU has blacklisted 
countries for granting “ring-fenced” tax benefits to foreign investors 
only, 16  countries might adopt equivalent ring-fenced non-tax 
subsidies. 
Therefore, this Article argues that international tax standards 
should not create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent 
tax benefits.  In addition to the efficiency considerations, this 
approach would be consistent with the principle of horizontal 
equity and would improve transparency.  This approach is 
comparable to the WTO subsidy rules and the EU state aid rules that 
generally treat equivalent tax and non-tax subsidies similarly.  Part 
V elaborates on these considerations and proposes several changes 
in the current international tax standards and the design of the 
proposed global minimum tax. 
The Article is organized as follows:  Part II provides background 
on subsidies and tax benefits.  Part III shows how MNEs are better 
off when they receive non-tax subsidies instead of equivalent tax 
benefits.  Part IV discusses countries’ incentives to adopt non-tax 
subsidies instead of tax incentives.  Part V considers the tax policy 
implications and proposes several changes in the international tax 
standards.  Part VI provides a conclusion. 
 
 15 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 980 (2004). 
 16 See discussion infra Section IV.b. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON SUBSIDIES AND TAX BENEFITS 
Governments can provide subsidies17 through cash grants, tax 
benefits,18 and other ways, such as allocating rights or providing 
goods or services at a rate below their market value.  Where a 
subsidy is structured as a tax benefit, it is, in substance, a spending 
program administered through the tax system.19  
It is generally possible to design a non-tax subsidy program 
(such as a cash grant scheme) so it would be economically equivalent 
to a tax incentive program, and vice versa.20  For example, assume 
 
 17  There is no general definition for the term “subsidy.” For an in-depth 
discussion about the definition of “subsidy,” see LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF 
SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE passim 
(2009).  Under the WTO definition, a subsidy exists where a government or a public 
body confer a benefit through a financial contribution or price support.  “Financial 
contribution” is defined broadly, and it includes fiscal incentives and tax benefits.  
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
U.N.T.S 14 [hereinafter WTO Subsidies Agreement]; see also discussion infra Part V. 
 18 Tax benefits are generally benefits administered by the tax authority that 
impact the taxpayers’ tax liability. 
 19 For an example of the extensive literature on tax expenditures, see Stanley 
S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison 
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) and the subsequent 
literature.  See also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, JCX-3-17, at 2 (2017) (“Special 
income tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they may be 
analogous to direct outlay programs and may be considered alternative means of 
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives.  Tax expenditures are similar to 
direct spending programs that function as entitlements to those who meet the 
established statutory criteria.”). 
 20 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, at 961 (“As Stanley Surrey noted in 
his tax expenditures analysis, virtually any program can be implemented in at least 
two ways.  It can be implemented through a direct spending program or through a 
tax program.”); Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 
36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 58 (2017) (“Tax incentives and cash transfers are not the same 
thing, but tax incentives can be designed similarly to cash transfers, and vice versa.  
This is a straightforward insight, which originated the tax expenditures idea.”); see 
also id. at 60 (“Any tax subsidy can be designed as an equivalent grant, and vice 
versa.  Both provide cash to innovation processes; both can be similarly contingent 
on certain market variables, or not; both can allocate innovation risk in the same 
way; both may require the same amount of information for design and 
implementation.”).  This assumes that there are no political, institutional, and 
implementation constraints.  Following Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, as no 
normative choice can be made between equivalent instruments, the choice of 
whether the subsidy should be granted as a tax benefit or as a cash grant largely 
depends on which government agency would optimally administer the scheme.  
For further articles implementing the approach proposed in Weisbach & Nussim, 
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that an MNE currently has an annual taxable income of $2,000 in 
Country X.  This income is currently taxed at 20%—$400 in tax paid 
per year.  The MNE considers opening a new research and 
development (R&D) center in Country X, but it will open it only if 
the government grants a tax benefit or a subsidy worth $400 per 
year.  The benefits for Country X from the R&D center are expected 
to be greater than $400 per year.  The government of Country X is 
indifferent about the design of the subsidy, which may be structured 
as one of the following incentives: 
(a) A tax benefit that exempts the income of $2,000 from tax, 
thereby saving the annual tax liability of $400. 
(b) Investment tax credits that offset the tax liability, thereby 
saving the annual tax liability of $400. 
(c) An annual government grant of $500 that is subject to a 
tax of 20% so that the net benefit is $400. 
(d) An annual government grant of $400 that is not subject 
to tax. 
These options have a similar effect:  The government grants the 
MNE a benefit of $400. 
Designing equivalent non-tax subsidies and tax benefits might 
be simpler in some cases and more complicated in others.  Tax 
benefits based on the taxpayer’s expenditure (e.g., R&D investment) 
can be replaced with cash subsidies based on the same expenditure.  
For example, a refundable investment credit is equivalent to a cash 
subsidy with a matching requirement.21  A non-refundable tax credit 
or a super deduction is equivalent to a subsidy that requires 
matching and is subject to a cap set at the recipient’s tax liability.22  
However, where there is a direct link between the subsidy and the 
tax liability, there is a higher risk that other countries might treat the 
non-tax subsidy as a tax benefit in disguise.  Less direct ways to 
design an equivalent non-tax subsidy would require estimating the 
expected tax liability and setting the cap accordingly. 
Tax benefits that exempt income can be replaced with a non-tax 
subsidy based on an estimate of the expected tax liability without 
 
supra note 15, see Noam Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research 
& Development Tax Benefits, 34 VA. TAX  REV. 109, 143 (2014); Noam Noked, Designing 
R&D Incentives in Hong Kong, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 41 (2019). 
 21 See Noked, Designing R&D Incentives in Hong Kong, supra note 20, at 60. 
 22 See id. 
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the exemption,23 or a subsidy subject to a cap set at the taxpayer’s 
tax liability.24  There may be cases where certain tax benefits cannot 
be substituted with non-tax subsidies that are entirely equivalent.  
Nonetheless, as MNEs and governments are repeat players, they can 
agree on mechanisms that achieve this equivalency over time, even 
if the substitution is imperfect.25  Substituting tax benefits with non-
tax subsidies and vice versa might not be possible; there may be 
political, legal and implementation constraints that limit the ability 
to replace some instruments with equivalent instruments.26 
III. MNES’ PREFERENCE FOR NON-TAX SUBSIDIES 
This Part analyzes three BEPS standards that contribute to the 
advantage MNEs have when they receive non-tax subsidies instead 
of equivalent tax benefits:  CbC reporting (Action 13), spontaneous 
exchange of tax rulings (Action 5), and the OECD recommendations 
for CFC rules (Action 3).27  After discussing these BEPS standards, 
this Part also considers the potential impact of the OECD’s recent 
proposal for a global minimum tax on the preference for non-tax 
subsidies. 
a. Country-by-Country Reports 
Many countries have started exchanging CbC reports since 2018.  
Tax authorities are expected to use these reports to identify where 
 
 23 Estimating the expected tax liability may be easier in some cases and harder 
in others.  It would be easier to reliably estimate the tax liability where the MNE’s 
income is stable, predictable, or where it depends on certain observable factors that 
can be used for the calculation of the subsidy (for example, where the income is 
calculated on a cost-plus basis, the subsidy can be calculated as a proportion of the 
relevant expenditure, similar to the calculation of the tax under the cost-plus 
method). 
 24 As noted above, where there is a direct link between the subsidy to the 
recipient’s tax liability, there is a higher risk that other countries might treat the 
subsidy as a tax subsidy in disguise. 
 25 For example, a multi-year subsidy may be updated annually to correct for 
previous years’ overpayment or underpayment. 
 26 See Nussim & Sorek, supra note 20, at 58. 
 27 In addition to these BEPS standards, it is possible that other BEPS standards 
that increase the pressure on tax competition also contribute to MNEs’ preference 
for subsidies. 
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MNEs may have been engaged in profit shifting to low-or-no tax 
jurisdictions.28  If, as a result of a tax benefit, an MNE pays no or low 
tax on its income in a particular jurisdiction, then there is a risk that 
other countries would tax that income.  This risk would be lower if 
the MNE pays tax on its income and receives a non-tax subsidy 
equal to the value of the equivalent tax benefit. 
When comparing the impact of various equivalent tax benefits 
and non-tax subsidies on the CbC report, the optimal incentive 
instrument is a non-tax subsidy subject to tax.  This non-tax subsidy 
results in the highest tax liability and effective tax rate.  The second-
best option is a non-tax subsidy exempted from tax.  Providing tax 
benefits—either through investment tax credits or a tax exemption—
results in an even lower effective tax rate and income tax liability in 
the relevant jurisdiction.  This is why tax benefits worsen the MNE’s 
position in other jurisdictions that may impose tax on the untaxed 
or lightly taxed MNE income in the jurisdiction that grants the tax 
benefits. 
Section III.a.i. provides a high-level summary of the CbC 
reporting requirements. 29   Section III.a.ii. discusses how various 
equivalent subsidies and tax benefits should be reflected in the CbC 
report.  This is demonstrated in the example in Section III.a.iii. 
i. General Requirements 
Under BEPS Action 13,  
large MNEs are required to file a Country-by-Country 
Report that will provide annually and for each tax 
jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of 
 
 28 For a discussion on the potential implications of the CbC reporting, see, e.g., 
Michelle Hanlon, Country-by-Country Reporting and the International Allocation of 
Taxing Rights, 72 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 209 (2018).  According to Hanlon, as a result 
of CbC reporting, MNEs will engage in less income shifting or move real economic 
activities to jurisdictions where they want to report income; CbC reporting will 
provide tax authorities with more data than what is currently available; 
governments will likely use this information to claim more taxing rights to MNEs’ 
income; where countries claim more taxing rights, there is a risk of more conflicts 
between countries; and it is possible that CbC reporting might lead to abandoning 
the arm’s length principle in favor of formulary apportionment or certain forms of 
source or destination-based taxation.  Id. at 216.  
 29 For further discussion on CbC reporting, see Noam Noked, Special Report, 
Public Country-by-Country Reporting: The Shareholders’ Case for Mandatory Disclosure, 
90 TAX NOTES INT’L 1501, 1502-03 (2018). 
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revenue, profit before income tax and income tax paid and 
accrued.  It also requires MNEs to report their number of 
employees, stated capital, retained earnings and tangible 
assets in each tax jurisdiction.30   
MNEs with annual consolidated group revenues of at least 750 
million euros must file CbC reports.31 
The MNE should file the CbC report in the jurisdiction where 
the MNE’s ultimate parent entity is resident, and that jurisdiction 
should exchange the information with the jurisdictions in which the 
MNE group operates if these jurisdictions meet certain conditions of 
confidentiality, consistency and appropriate use. 32   Where the 
ultimate parent entity’s jurisdiction of residence does not exchange 
the CbC reports with other jurisdictions which satisfy the relevant 
conditions, other jurisdictions can require a local entity from the 
MNE group to file the CbC report for the whole group.33  In general, 
the first reported year was 2016, and the reporting started in 2018.34 
The CbC report requires the reporting of the following 
information for each of the jurisdictions where the MNE does 
business:  revenues divided into revenues from related and 
 
 30 See OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
REPORTING, ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13], 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241480-en.pdf?expires=160796
8695&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=ED816ADE849164B482AB47A4E680DF
DE [https://perma.cc/W3Q9-B58J]. 
 31 Id. at 10. 
 32 Id. ¶¶ 56-59. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. ¶ 50.  While some countries followed this timeline, other countries 
have adopted or will adopt a more delayed implementation timeline.  For example, 
in Hong Kong, the first year to be reported is 2018.  Hong Kong MNEs may 
voluntarily file CbC reports for 2016 or 2017.  The first exchange will take place later 
than 2018.  See OECD, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING – COMPILATION OF PEER 
REVIEW REPORTS (PHASE 2): INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: ACTION 13, at 231-36 
(2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/f9bf1157-
en.pdf?expires=1607968820&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=EE9E9A87779C9
61DED2DF27F09B07704 [https://perma.cc/XDY7-H49S]. 
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unrelated parties,35 profit (loss) before income tax,36 income tax paid 
(on cash basis), 37  income tax accrued in the current year, stated 
capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees, and tangible 
assets other than cash and cash equivalents.38  
Income tax cash payments are generally less susceptible to 
accounting manipulation, so it is possible that tax authorities will 
pay close attention to the income tax paid and to the ratio of the 
income tax paid to the before-tax profits or the revenues.  The 
discussion below shows that the choice between equivalent 
instruments has substantial implications on the income tax liability 
and these ratios. 
Action 13 does not instruct which accounting principles should 
be used by MNEs when preparing the CbC reports.  Action 13 noted 
that each MNE “may choose to use data from its consolidation 
reporting packages, from separate entity statutory financial 
statements, regulatory financial statements, or internal management 
accounts.”39  The discussion below assumes that the MNE uses the 
financial statements as the source of data for the CbC report, and 
that the relevant accounting standards generally follow the 
International Accounting Standards (“IAS”). 
 
 35 In the “Revenues” column, the MNE should report the following:  
(i) the sum of revenues of all the Constituent Entities of the MNE group in 
the relevant tax jurisdiction generated from transactions with associated 
enterprises; (ii) the sum of revenues of all the Constituent Entities of the 
MNE group in the relevant tax jurisdiction generated from transactions 
with independent parties; and (iii) the total of (i) and (ii).  Revenues should 
include revenues from sales of inventory and properties, services, 
royalties, interest, premiums and any other amounts. 
ACTION 13, supra note 31, at 33. 
 36 In the “Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” column, the MNE should report 
“the sum of the profit (loss) before income tax for all the Constituent Entities 
resident for tax purposes in the relevant tax jurisdiction.  The profit (loss) before 
income tax should include all extraordinary income and expense items.”  Id. 
 37 In the “Income Tax Paid (on Cash Basis)” column the MNE should report 
“the total amount of income tax actually paid during the relevant fiscal year by all 
the Constituent Entities resident for tax purposes in the relevant tax jurisdiction.”  
Id. 
 38 Id. at 29. 
 39 Id. at 32. 
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ii. How Subsidies and Tax Benefits Affect the CbC Reports 
How will subsidies to MNEs be reflected in CbC reports?  IAS 
20 provides guidance on the accounting of government grants and 
other forms of government assistance.40  In general, an entity can 
recognize a government grant when there is reasonable assurance 
that the entity will comply with the conditions attached to the 
grant,41 and that the grant will be received.42  The income should be 
recognized over the period in which the related costs are incurred.43  
Grants should be presented in the income statement either 
separately or as “other income.”44  Alternatively, it is possible to 
deduct the grants from the related expenses.45  IAS 20 does not apply 
to government assistance in the form of tax incentives.46   When 
grants are recognized as income or as a reduction of an expense, this 
should increase the “Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” column in the 
CbC report.  Under Action 13 and the applicable OECD guidance, it 
appears that grants recognized as income should be included in the 
“Revenues” column in the CbC report.47  It is unclear whether grants 
 
 40  INT’L. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 20, 
ACCOUNTING FOR GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND THE DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT 
ASSISTANCE (1983) [hereinafter IAS 20]. 
 41 “Government grants” are defined broadly as  
assistance by government in the form of transfers of resources to an entity 
in return for past or future compliance with certain conditions relating to 
the operating activities of the entity.  They exclude those forms of 
government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon 
them and transactions with government which cannot be distinguished 
from the normal trading transactions of the entity.   
Id. ¶ 3. 
 42 Id. ¶ 7. 
 43 Id. ¶ 12. 
 44 Id. ¶ 29. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. ¶ 2(b) (limiting the scope of IAS to not include “government assistance 
that is provided for an entity in the form of benefits that are available in determining 
taxable profit or tax loss, or are determined or limited on the basis of income tax 
liability.  Examples of such benefits are income tax holidays, investment tax credits, 
accelerated depreciation allowances and reduced income tax rates”).  
 47 ACTION 13, supra note 30, at 33.  The OECD guidance also provides that “[a]ll 
revenue, gains, income, or other inflows shown in the financial statement prepared 
in accordance with the applicable accounting rules relating to profit and loss, such 
as the income statement or profit and loss statement, should be reported as 
Revenues in Table 1.”  OECD, GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY-BY-
COUNTRY REPORTING, BEPS ACTION 13, at 7 (2019) [hereinafter OECD GUIDANCE], 
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should be included in the “Revenues” column where the grants are 
treated as a reduction of the relevant expense.  The impact of the 
grant on the “Income Tax Paid (On Cash Basis)”48 column depends 
on whether the grant is exempted from income tax.49  If the grant is 
subject to tax, then this additional tax will increase the entity’s tax 
liability.  If the grant is exempted from taxation, then it will not 
increase the tax liability. 
Tax benefits that are not investment tax credits (e.g., a tax 
exemption) should be disclosed separately,50 and not as part of the 
entity’s revenues or income before tax.  Thus, if a tax benefit (other 
than investment tax credit) is received, it will not increase the CbC 
report’s revenues and profit (loss) before income tax.  A tax benefit 
would reduce the “Income tax paid” column because the tax paid 
would be lower if a tax benefit is received. 
Investment tax credits are excluded from both IAS 20 and IAS 
12, and the International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) do 
not provide guidance on how they should be reflected in the 
 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/guidance-on-the-implementation-of-country-by-coun
try-reporting-beps-action-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ2G-M2TT].  According to 
the OECD guidance, the “Revenues” also include income items such as “other 
income” that may not be included in the revenue line of the income statement.  Id. 
(“For example, if the income statement prepared in accordance with the applicable 
accounting rules shows sales revenue, net capital gains from sales of assets, 
unrealized gains, interest received, and extraordinary income, the amount of those 
items reported in the income statement should be aggregated and reported as 
Revenues in Table 1.”). 
 48 This column is referred to as “Income Tax Paid” in the discussion below. 
 49 The taxation of grants depends on the terms of each particular grant and 
the domestic tax law in the relevant jurisdiction.  For example, Canada, Australia, 
and Singapore apply different tax rules to different grants.  See TOVA EPP, 
GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND THEIR TAX TREATMENTS (2018), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5565ecede4b0df78d78d2b36/t/5bc6926de
2c483c657da646f/1539740274622/GovernmentGrantsWhitepaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X27T-FVEH] (for Canada); CPA AUSTRALIA, GRANTS IN 
AUSTRALIA (2012), 
https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/~/media/corporate/allfiles/document/profe
ssional-resources/notforprofit/grants-in-australia.pdf [https://perma.cc/366G-
UL3T] (for Australia); Tax Treatment of Grants/Payouts Commonly Received by 
Companies, INLAND REVENUE AUTH. SING. (May 2020), 
https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Businesses/Companies/Working-out-Corpo
rate-Income-Taxes/Taxable-and-Non-Taxable-Income/Tax-Treatment-of-Grants/
-Payouts-Commonly-Received-by-Companies/ [https://perma.cc/WB4E-8J4K] 
(for Singapore). 
 50 INT’L. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 12, at 
§ 79 (1996) [hereinafter IAS 12]. 
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financial statements.51  The accounting treatment of investment tax 
credits depends on the applicable domestic legislation, group policy, 
and other factors, such as whether the investment tax credits are 
refundable (i.e., can be settled with cash).52  For example, in 2013 the 
United Kingdom introduced the Research and Development 
Expenditure Credit (also known as the “above the line” credit), 
which provides a tax credit for qualifying R&D expenditure.53  This 
credit is similar to a subsidy because it is payable in cash, net of tax, 
to companies with no tax liability.54  The accounting treatment of 
this credit would likely be similar to the treatment of a government 
grant.  Other investment tax credits may be reported similarly to 
other tax benefits, resulting in no impact on the “Revenues” and 
“Profit (Loss) before Income Tax” columns.  If the entity that receives 
the credit has taxable income before applying the credit, receiving 
this credit should reduce the “Income Tax Paid (on Cash Basis)” 
column. 
Table 1 summarizes how government grants, investment tax 
credits, and tax benefits other than investment tax credits should be 
reflected in the following columns of the CbC report:  “Revenues,” 
“Profit (Loss) before Income Tax,” and “Income Tax Paid.” 
  
 
 51  See Silvia, Tax Incentives - IAS 12 or IAS 20?, CPD BOX (2015), 
https://www.cpdbox.com/tax-incentives-accounting-ifrs/ 
[https://perma.cc/BC2G-5J4T]; Valerie Boissou, KPMG, Government Grants: IFRS 
Compared to US GAAP (May 31, 2019), 
https://advisory.kpmg.us/articles/2019/government-grants-ifrs-compared-to-us
-gaap.html [https://perma.cc/G8FS-WBGE].  
 52 See id. 
 53 Kathie Haunton & Sarah Goodman, Taking the Credit, TAXADVISER (Aug. 1, 
2015), https://www.taxadvisermagazine.com/article/taking-credit 
[https://perma.cc/A2AN-VGMZ]; see Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure 
Credit, GOV.UK (Jan. 1, 2007), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-
research-and-development-tax-relief-for-large-companies 
[https://perma.cc/TJU7-YUF8]. 
 54 For additional guidance, see Haunton & Goodman, supra note 54. 
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Table 1 
 
CbC Report 
Item 
Government Grants  Tax Benefits Other 
Than Investment 
Tax Credits  
Investment Tax 
Credits 
Revenues 
and Profit 
(Loss) Before 
Income Tax 
Government grants 
increase the 
“Revenues” and the 
“Profit (loss) before 
tax” columns.  
Tax benefits 
generally do not 
affect the 
“Revenues” and the 
“Profit (loss) before 
tax” columns.  
Depending on the 
terms of the credits 
and the accounting 
policy, investment tax 
credits may or may 
not affect the 
“Revenues” and the 
“Profit (loss) before 
tax” columns. 
Income Tax 
Paid (on 
Cash Basis) 
Depending on the 
specific terms, a 
government grant 
may or may not be 
subject to corporate 
income tax. 
Tax benefits 
generally reduce the 
“Income tax paid” 
column.  
Investment tax credits 
generally reduce the 
“Income tax paid” 
column.  
iii. Example 
This example demonstrates the impact of equivalent non-tax 
subsidies and tax benefits on the CbC report.  In this example, an 
MNE currently has annual revenues of $2,500 and an annual profit 
before tax of $2,000 in Country X.  This profit is currently taxed at 
20%—$400 in tax paid per year. Assume that an MNE is considering 
opening a new R&D center in Country X.  It will open the R&D 
center in Country X only if the government grants a tax benefit or a 
non-tax subsidy worth $400 per year.  The benefits for Country X 
from the R&D center are expected to be greater than $400 per year.  
The government of Country X is indifferent about the design of the 
subsidy, which may be structured as one of the following incentives:   
(a) Tax benefits (which are not investment tax credits) that 
exempt the income before tax of $2,000, thereby eliminating 
the annual tax liability of $400. 
(b) Investment tax credits that offset the tax liability, thereby 
eliminating the annual tax liability of $400. 
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(c) An annual government grant of 500 that is subject to tax 
of 20%, so that the net benefit is $400. 
(d) An annual government grant of $400 that is not subject 
to tax. 
Table 2 summarizes how each incentive will be reflected in the 
MNE’s CbC report. Units are United States Dollars unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Table 2 
 
Item in 
the CbC 
report  
Before the 
incentive 
(a) Tax 
exemption 
(b) Investment 
tax credits 
(c) Grant 
subject to 
tax  
(d) Grant 
not 
subject 
to tax  
Revenues  
 
2,500 2,500 2,500 or 2,900 3,000 2,900 
Profit 
(loss) 
before 
income 
tax 
2,000 2,000 2,000 or 2,400 2,500 2,400 
Income 
tax paid 
400 0 0 500 400 
Net 
benefit 
 
0 400 400 400 400 
Ratio of 
income 
tax paid 
to 
revenues 
16.66% 0% 0% 16.66% 13.79% 
Ratio of 
income 
tax paid 
to profit 
before 
income 
tax  
20% 0% 0% 20% 16.66% 
 
Under option (a), the tax exemption does not increase the 
“Revenues” and the “Profit (Loss) Before Tax” columns, and they 
remain unchanged ($2,500 and $2,000, respectively).  The tax 
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exemption reduces the tax liability to zero, resulting in an effective 
tax rate of zero—much lower than the effective tax rate of 20% before 
granting the subsidy. 
Under option (b), some investment tax credits may not affect the 
“Revenues” and “Profit (Loss) Before Tax” columns, while other 
investment tax credits (e.g., “above the line” credits) may increase 
them.  The exact accounting treatment depends on the terms of the 
credits and the accounting policy.  Similar to option (a), the 
investment tax credits reduce the tax liability to zero, and the 
effective tax rate is zero. 
Under option (c), we assume that the government grant of $500 
is subject to corporate income tax.  As the government grant should 
generally be included in the “Revenues”55  and the “Profit (Loss) 
Before Tax” columns, they increase to $3,000 and $2,500, 
respectively.  The “Income Tax Paid” column increases from $400 to 
$500 because of the additional tax on the government grant.  The 
effective tax rate, calculated as the ratio of the income tax paid to 
profit (loss) before tax, is 20%, similar to the effective tax rate before 
granting the non-tax subsidy. 
Under option (d), we assume that the government grant of $400 
is exempted from corporate income tax.  The grant should be 
included in the “Revenues” and the “Profit (Loss) Before Tax” 
columns, so that they increase to $2,900 and $2,400, respectively.  As 
the tax liability remains the same, the “Income Tax Paid” column 
remains $400.  The effective tax rate is 16.66%, lower than the 
effective tax rate before granting the non-tax subsidy, but 
substantially higher than zero as in options (a) and (b). 
Although all four alternatives provide subsidies with the same 
economic value ($400), they vary in their impact on the MNE’s CbC 
report.  Consequently, the resulting risks for the MNE differ 
substantially.  From a CbC reporting perspective, the optimal 
subsidy would follow alternative (c)—a government grant subject to 
tax—because this subsidy shows the highest tax liability and the 
highest effective tax rate.  The second-best option follows alternative 
(d) as it results in lower tax liability and effective tax rate.  Options 
(a) and (b)—providing tax benefits—put the MNE in the worst 
position because tax authorities in other jurisdictions might try to 
 
 55 As noted in Section III.a.ii., supra, it is unclear if a government grant should 
be reflected in the “Revenues” column if the MNE records the grant as a reduction 
of a relevant expense and not as income, although in principle this appears to be 
the correct approach.  This example assumes that the grant has been recorded as 
income, and thus it should be included in the “Revenues” column in the CbC report. 
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tax the untaxed income in Country X, claiming that the MNE shifted 
profits to that jurisdiction in order to avoid taxation in other 
jurisdictions. 
This example demonstrates another important point about the 
effect of CbC reporting.  Although the OECD has stated that BEPS 
measures should target only instances where MNEs “artificially 
shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no 
economic activity,” 56  they, in fact, discourage all tax benefits, 
including tax benefits for substantial economic activities.  For 
example, if a MNE does not pay tax on its profits in Hong Kong or 
Singapore because it receives tax benefits for investing in R&D 
activities in those jurisdictions, the CbC report will reveal no income 
tax paid or accrued, thereby exposing the MNE to a higher risk of 
other countries’ tax authorities arguing that the MNE shifted profits 
to those jurisdictions to avoid taxation. 
Where an MNE pays low taxes as a result of receiving non-
harmful tax benefits for the income generated in the relevant 
jurisdiction that provided the tax benefits, the MNE should be able 
to explain that to other countries’ tax authorities, and they should 
not tax that income.  However, in reality, the reporting of untaxed 
or lightly taxed income puts the MNE at risk because of the 
increased risk for audits and disputes, the risk that other countries’ 
tax authorities might reject the MNE’s explanations, and the risk that 
some tax authorities might misuse the CbC reporting.57 
b. Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings 
BEPS Action 5 states that countries which joined the BEPS 
Inclusive Framework must spontaneously exchange certain tax 
rulings with certain jurisdictions.58  The term “ruling” means “any 
 
 56  What is BEPS?: What is the Issue?, OECD (2019), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm [https://perma.cc/838R-6WFM].  
Similar language appears in the BEPS action plan and final reports.  See OECD, 
OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: 
2015 FINAL REPORT 14 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-
statement-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EJ-QHER]. 
 57 See, e.g., William Hoke, Multinationals Concerned about Misuse of CbC Reports, 
85 TAX NOTES INT’L 409 (2017). 
 58  OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 
COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT 
TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 45-46 (2015), 
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advice, information or undertaking provided by a tax authority to a 
specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers concerning their tax 
situation and on which they are entitled to rely.” 59   Rulings 
concerning preferential tax regimes must be exchanged.  
Rulings concerning non-tax subsidies are outside the scope of 
this definition.  Tax authorities typically do not provide any advice, 
information, or undertaking about non-tax subsidies.  In addition, 
non-tax subsidies do not directly affect a taxpayer’s “tax situation.”  
Action 5 neither discusses nor mentions subsidies, government 
grants, or other non-tax government incentives.  Thus, non-tax 
subsidies are generally not subject to compulsory spontaneous 
exchange which applies to tax rulings under BEPS. 
Before the compulsory spontaneous exchange under Action 5, 
other countries affected by tax rulings may not have been aware of 
them.  Now, when other countries know about the rulings, there is 
a higher likelihood that those other countries will audit the MNEs 
that receive the tax benefits under these tax rulings and impose 
higher taxes if the rulings are used for profit shifting. 
To avoid the reporting of the incentives granted under a 
reportable tax ruling, governments may provide equivalent non-tax 
 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241190-en.pdf?expires=160796
9397&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=67EC66CBF667728AEE243D3E71EF3233 
[https://perma.cc/4AJF-AGYT].  The jurisdictions that receive the rulings are 
generally the jurisdictions  
of residence of all related parties with which the taxpayer enters into a 
transaction for which a ruling is granted or which gives rise to income 
from related parties benefiting from a preferential treatment . . . and the 
residence [jurisdiction] of the ultimate parent company and the immediate 
parent company.   
Id. ¶ 121. 
 59 Id. ¶ 95 (footnote omitted).  Action 5 provides a list of six categories of 
taxpayer-specific rulings to which the compulsory spontaneous exchange applies:  
(i) rulings relating to preferential regimes; (ii) unilateral APAs [advance 
pricing agreements] or other cross-border unilateral rulings in respect of 
transfer pricing; (iii) cross-border rulings providing for a downward 
adjustment of taxable profits; (iv) permanent establishment (PE) rulings; 
(v) related party conduit rulings; and (vi) any other type of ruling agreed 
by the FHTP [Forum on Harmful Tax Practices] that in the absence of 
spontaneous information exchange gives rise to BEPS concerns.   
Id. ¶ 91. 
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subsidies.  Such non-tax subsidies may be kept confidential if the 
disclosure is not required under other laws.60 
c. CFC Rules 
BEPS Action 3 provides recommendations for the design of CFC 
rules.  Although these recommendations are considered as non-
binding “soft law,” the OECD notes that “there is an expectation that 
they will be implemented accordingly by countries that are part of 
the consensus.”61 
One of the OECD recommendations is “to include a tax rate 
exemption that would allow companies that are subject to an 
effective tax rate that is sufficiently similar to the tax rate applied in 
the parent jurisdiction not to be subject to CFC taxation.”62  The tax 
rate exemption requires that the rate at which the CFC was taxed be 
below a certain threshold, which could be a particular fixed rate 
(e.g., ten percent) or a percentage of the parent country’s own rate 
on a similar income.63  Once the threshold has been determined, the 
tax rate in the CFC jurisdiction should be compared to the threshold.  
Action 3 recommends using the effective rate of the CFC itself and 
not the nominal or statutory tax rate in the jurisdiction of the CFC.64  
The calculation of the effective tax rate is based on the ratio of the 
actual tax paid in the CFC jurisdiction to the total taxable income.65  
 
 60 Disclosure of certain subsidies may be required under the WTO subsidy 
rules and the EU state aid rules.  See Commission Regulation 651/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 
187) 1 (EU); Commission Regulation 1388/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 369) 37 (EU); 
Commission Regulation 702/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 193) 1 (EU); WORLD TRADE ORG., 
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, at 194 (2006), 
https://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report06
_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6VX-B2BX].  However, many subsidies are not within 
the scope of these rules. 
 61 OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL 
REPORTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
frequently-asked-questions.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4CG-7E9K]. 
 62 OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: DEFINING 
EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES: ACTION 3: 2015 FINAL REPORT ¶ 51 
(2015), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241152-
en.pdf?expires=1607969647&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4BCF8B61DC243
EC8962B7701AC099AFB [https://perma.cc/YC4L-A7KQ]. 
 63 See id. ¶ 63. 
 64 See id. ¶ 65. 
 65 See id. ¶ 66.  This calculation typically follows the rules of the parent’s 
country or the IFRS. 
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Another OECD recommendation is to provide a tax credit for 
foreign taxes paid by the CFC where its income is subject to foreign 
tax.66 
Where these recommendations are followed, MNEs should 
generally be better off when their CFCs receive non-tax subsidies 
instead of tax benefits.  For example, assume that a CFC which 
reports taxable income of $2,000 in a jurisdiction with a corporate 
income tax rate of twenty percent can choose between the following 
alternatives: 
(a) Tax benefit that will reduce its tax liability to zero, 
thereby saving $400. 
(b) Subsidy of $500 that is subject to tax, resulting in a net 
benefit of $400. 
(c) Subsidy of $400 that is not subject to tax. 
Table 3 summarizes the taxable income, tax liability, and 
effective tax rate for the three alternatives. 
Table 3 
 
 (a) Tax benefits  (b) Subsidy 
subject to tax  
(c) Subsidy not 
subject to tax  
Taxable income 2,000 2,500 2,00067 
Income tax  0 500 400 
Effective tax rate 0% 20% 20% 
 
If the CFC receives a subsidy, the effective tax rate will be twenty 
percent.  If the CFC receives a tax benefit, the tax rate would be zero 
percent.  A higher effective tax rate is more likely to qualify for a tax 
rate exemption under other countries’ CFC rules.  In addition, even 
if the effective tax rate is below the exemption threshold, a parent 
company of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on 
its taxable income should be able to claim a tax credit for the tax the 
CFC paid.  A parent company of a CFC that receives a tax benefit 
and does not pay any tax cannot claim any credit.  Therefore, the 
 
 66 See id. ¶¶ 122-27. 
 67 If the subsidy amount is included in the taxable income, then the figure 
should be 2,400, and the effective tax rate should be 16.66%.  There is no clear 
guidance on whether a tax-exempt subsidy should be included in the CFC’s income 
for the purpose of applying the CFC rules.  
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application of CFC rules following the OECD recommendations 
would favor CFCs that receive non-tax subsidies and disfavor CFCs 
that receive equivalent tax benefits. 
d. Proposal for a Global Minimum Tax 
The OECD is now developing a proposal for a global minimum 
tax as part of the OECD’s work on international tax challenges 
arising from the digital economy.68  The OECD’s recent proposals 
are grouped into two pillars:  Pillar One addresses the challenges of 
the cross-border digital economy by allocating the taxing rights with 
respect to such businesses.69  Pillar Two’s scope is much broader, as 
it “focuses on the remaining BEPS issues and seeks to develop rules 
that would provide jurisdictions with a right to ‘tax back’ where 
other jurisdictions have not exercised their primary taxing rights or 
the payment is otherwise subject to low levels of effective 
taxation.”70   The OECD’s proposal under Pillar Two—the GloBE 
proposal—is a proposal for a global minimum tax.  Although this 
proposal has been developed as part of the OECD’s work on 
challenges arising from the digital economy, the envisaged global 
minimum tax would not be limited only to the digital economy.71  
The OECD has noted that “it proposes a systematic solution 
 
 68  OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROJECT SHIFTING PROJECT: PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION 
OF THE ECONOMY (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-
document-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J8NZ-WQ9K].  For further discussion about the GloBE proposal 
and the design considerations, see LUC DE BROE, ROBERT J. DANON & VIKRAM CHAND, 
COMMENTS TO PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION 
PROPOSAL (“GLOBE”) – PILLAR TWO 8-9 (2019), 
https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_D8C1987EFA9C.P001/REF 
[https://perma.cc/4492-V38Y]; MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX ET AL., THE OECD GLOBAL 
ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL 18-19 (2020), 
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-02/OECD_GloBE_proposal_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F8Y-SFPS]; Lorraine Eden, Taxing Multinationals: 
The GloBE Proposal for a Global Minimum Tax, 49 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 1 (2020); Joachim 
Englisch & Johannes Becker, International Effective Minimum Taxation – The GLOBE 
Proposal, 11 WORLD TAX J. 483 (2019).  For further discussion on the GloBE regime 
and potential reactions of affected countries, see Noam Noked, Defense of Primary 
Taxing Rights, 40 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 69 OECD, supra note 11, ¶ 11. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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designed to ensure that all internationally operating businesses pay 
a minimum level of tax.”72 
In October 2020, the OECD published a blueprint for Pillar Two 
which lays out the OECD’s detailed proposal for the design of the 
GloBE regime.73  In this publication, the OECD stated that “[t]he 
finalisation of Pillar Two also requires political agreement on key 
design features of the subject to tax rule and the GloBE rules 
including carve-outs, blending, rule order and tax rates where, at 
present, diverging views continue to exist.”74  The OECD also noted 
that it intends to “swiftly address the remaining issues with a view 
to bringing the process to a successful conclusion by mid-2021 and 
to resolve technical issues, develop model draft legislation, 
guidelines, and international rules and processes as necessary to 
enable jurisdictions to implement a consensus based solution.”75 
The OECD proposal includes four rules:  the income inclusion 
rule, the undertaxed payments rule, the switch-over rule, and the 
subject to tax rule.76   The income inclusion rule “would tax the 
income of a foreign branch or a controlled entity if that income was 
subject to tax at an effective rate that is below a minimum rate.”77 
This rule is a form of a global, unified CFC regime which 
imposes taxation on CFC income where it is lightly taxed.78  Thus, 
the discussion above with respect to the impact of CFC rules on the 
preference for non-tax subsidies is relevant here:  Taxation under the 
income inclusion rule is less likely to be triggered where a subsidiary 
or a branch79 receives a non-tax subsidy because the effective tax rate 
would be higher.  Under the OECD proposal, non-tax government 
grants should be considered as income; refundable tax credits that 
meet certain conditions should also be treated as income; and 
 
 72 Id. ¶ 55. 
 73  OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: TAX 
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – REPORT ON PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT 
(2020) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT], 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/abb4c3d1-en.pdf?expires=1607959735
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=51E3276343C90F0D14BCC591ECA7F40F 
[https://perma.cc/WH3T-U3KT]. 
 74 Id. ¶ 6.  
 75 Id. at 12.  
 76 OECD, supra note 11, ¶ 50. 
 77 Id. ¶ 56(1).  
 78 Id. at 29; BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, ¶ 9 (“The operation of the IIR is, in some 
respects, based on traditional controlled foreign company (CFC) rule principles . . . 
.”). 
 79 The discussion of subsidiaries in this Part also includes branches. 
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refundable tax credits that do not meet these conditions as well as 
non-refundable tax credits should reduce the covered tax liability.80  
Where the effective tax rate is below the global minimum tax 
rate, the top-up tax under the income inclusion rule would be the 
difference between the tax paid by the subsidiary and the tax that 
should be paid under the global minimum tax rate.81  This means the 
tax under the income inclusion rule would generally be lower where 
a subsidiary receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on its income 
instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit and paying no or low 
tax.  This would also be the case where the undertaxed payments 
rule applies because this rule follows the income inclusion rule’s 
methodology for the calculation of the subsidiary’s effective tax rate 
and top-up tax.82 
The subject to tax rule would result in additional taxation up to 
the global minimum tax rate where certain covered payments 
between connected persons are subject to an adjusted nominal tax 
rate below the minimum rate in the payee jurisdiction.83  In general, 
covered payments include royalties, franchise fees, interest fees, and 
 
 80 BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at 69.  The conditions that refundable tax credits 
need to meet in order to be treated as income (i.e., to be classified as a “qualified 
refundable tax credit”) are as follows:  
[T]he tax credit regime must be designed in a way so that a credit becomes 
refundable within 4 years from when it is first provided.  Where the tax 
credit regime under the laws of a jurisdiction provides for partial 
refundability such that only a fixed percentage or portion of the credit is 
refundable, in order for the refundable portion of the credit to be treated 
as a qualified refundable tax credit, it must become refundable within 4 
years from when it is first provided.   
Furthermore, if a refundable tax credit regime is determined to give rise 
to a material competitive distortion under the review process described 
below, a credit granted under such a regime will not be treated as a 
‘qualified refundable tax credit’ under the GloBE.  
Id.   
 81 For further details on how the top-up tax is calculated and applied, see 
BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 410-52.  
 82 Id. ¶¶ 12-19.  Notably, the undertaxed payments rule is a secondary rule 
that would only apply where the income inclusion rule does not apply.  Id.  The 
allocation of the top-up tax under the undertaxed payments rule is different than 
that of the income inclusion rule.  For the design details of this rule, see id. at 121-
41.  The Blueprint refers to the income inclusion rule and the undertaxed payments 
rule as the GloBE rules.  See id. at 15. 
 83 Id. ¶¶ 20, 566-667.   
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other payments.84  The OECD proposes that preferential tax rates 
that apply to a covered payment (e.g., royalties) should reduce the 
adjusted nominal tax rate.85  This means that granting tax benefits 
would increase the risk of tax under the subject of tax rule.  The tax 
under this rule would be lower where a subsidiary is subject to a 
higher adjusted nominal tax rate on covered payments and receives 
a non-tax subsidy, instead of receiving an equivalent tax benefit 
(that reduces the adjusted nominal tax rate) and paying no or low 
tax on the relevant payment. 
An important design question is whether the GloBE regime 
would allow for carve-outs for income from substantial activities in 
the relevant jurisdictions.  The OECD previously noted that carve-
outs would “undermine the policy intent and effectiveness of the 
GloBE proposal.”86  However, “some jurisdictions have stressed the 
importance of including substance carve-outs because, in their view, 
such carve-outs are necessary to ensure that the focus of Pillar Two 
is on remaining BEPS issues.”87  The OECD now proposes adopting 
formulaic substance-based carve-outs based on payroll and tangible 
assets, providing that a “modest return” on expenditures on payroll 
and tangible assets would be excluded.88  The OECD noted that, 
“provided the amount of the carve-out is limited to a modest return 
(sometimes referred to as a ‘routine return’) on expenditures for 
payroll and tangible assets, then the MNE will not generally be able 
to use the carve-out to shelter other low-tax returns in a particular 
jurisdiction.”89  The proposed carve-outs might not fully exclude 
income benefitting from non-harmful preferential tax regimes.  If 
this is the case and the proposed carve-outs are adopted, then the 
attractiveness of such preferential tax regimes would decrease 
 
 84 See id. ¶¶ 588-616.  These other payments include insurance/reinsurance 
premiums, guarantee, brokerage or financing fees, rental payments for using 
moveable property, and “an amount paid to or retained by the payee that is 
consideration for the supply of marketing, procurement, agency or other 
intermediary services.”  Id. at 156.   
 85 Id. ¶ 640.  
 86 OECD, supra note 11, at 29. 
 87  OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROJECT SHIFTING PROJECT: 
STATEMENT BY THE OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS ON THE TWO-PILLAR 
APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF 
THE ECONOMY ¶ 12 (2020), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-by-the-
oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UA3G-UX7Z]. 
 88 BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, at 92-100.  
 89 Id. ¶ 333. 
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because the MNEs would still be taxed on the relevant income.  This 
would increase countries’ motivation to replace such tax incentives 
with non-tax subsidies.90  
Another important design question concerns “blending”: “the 
extent to which an MNE can combine high-tax and low-tax income 
from different sources taking into account the relevant taxes on such 
income in determining the effective (blended) tax rate on such 
income.”91   If the global minimum tax is implemented based on 
worldwide blending,92 granting tax benefits is less likely to trigger a 
global minimum tax where the MNE’s blended effective tax rate is 
above the minimum rate.  Thus, the impact on tax incentives would 
be lower.  However, if the GloBE rules are implemented on a 
country-by-country basis (jurisdictional blending) as proposed by 
the OECD, 93  this would make tax incentives less attractive 
(assuming that there is no carve-out for the income benefitting from 
these tax incentives) because the relevant income could be subject to 
a global minimum tax in other jurisdictions. 
Other design features of the global minimum tax could influence 
the incentives that governments would offer to attract MNE 
investment.  For example, if the chosen minimum tax rate is 10%, 
then governments can offer tax benefits that reduce the MNEs’ 
effective tax rate down to this rate, and any further incentives could 
be granted as non-tax subsidies.  To conclude, the OECD’s proposal 
has the potential to further increase the tax-driven preference for 
non-tax subsidies, especially if adopted without carve-outs for non-
harmful tax benefits.   
IV. COUNTRIES’ PREFERENCE FOR NON-TAX SUBSIDIES 
Countries now have stronger incentives to adopt non-tax 
subsidies instead of equivalent tax incentives.  As MNEs prefer non-
tax subsidies to tax benefits for the reasons explained in Part III, 
countries can attract more MNE investment at the same economic 
 
 90 For further discussion about the implications of carve-outs, see DEVEREUX 
ET AL., supra note 68, at 18-19; DE BROE, DANON & CHAND, supra note 68, at 9-10. 
 91 OECD, supra note 5, ¶ 11(b).  For analysts’ views on blending, see DEVEREUX 
ET AL., supra note 68, at 18; DE BROE, DANON & CHAND, supra note 68, at 8-9. 
 92 Under the blended approach, the effective tax rate is calculated based on 
the MNE’s tax liability and taxable income in all jurisdictions outside that of the 
parent company; OECD, supra note 5, at 7. 
 93 BLUEPRINT, supra note 74, ¶ 285. 
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cost by offering non-tax subsidies instead of tax benefits.  In 
addition, the OECD and the EU scrutinize the preferential tax 
regimes offered by countries around the world.  Countries run the 
risk of being targeted by the OECD or the EU if they find they offer 
harmful preferential tax regimes.  These risks can be avoided by 
offering non-tax subsidies instead of tax benefits.   
a. OECD’s Scrutiny Over Harmful Tax Practices 
In a 1998 report, the OECD set up a policy to address the 
problem of harmful tax practices.94  The report called for the creation 
of a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (“FHTP”) and developed a 
framework for assessing whether a preferential tax regime should 
be considered as harmful. 95   The assessment of whether a 
preferential tax regime is harmful should consider various factors.  
The five key factors are as follows:   
(i) The regime imposes no or low effective tax rates on 
income from geographically mobile financial and other 
service activities.   
(ii) The regime is ring-fenced from the domestic economy.   
(iii) The regime lacks transparency.   
(iv) There is no effective exchange of information with 
respect to the regime.   
(v) The regime fails to require substantial activities.96   
 
 94  OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/1904176.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T89-
B6X4]. 
 95 See id. ¶¶ 10, 18. 
 96 OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: HARMFUL 
TAX PRACTICES – 2018 PROGRESS REPORT ON PREFERENTIAL REGIMES: INCLUSIVE 
FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: ACTION 5, ¶ 18 (2019), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264311480-en.pdf?expires=1607962177&id=id&accna
me=guest&checksum=1CF12193CAA210699ED141838FF9DD68 
[https://perma.cc/U6UP-GARL].  In addition to the key factors, there are other 
secondary factors: “(i) An artificial definition of the tax base.  (ii) Failure to adhere 
to international transfer pricing principles.  (iii) Foreign source income exempt from 
residence country taxation.  (iv) Negotiable tax rate or tax base.  (v) Existence of 
secrecy provisions.”  Id. ¶ 19.  The factors in the OECD 1998 report were somewhat 
different and were updated as part of the BEPS project and the subsequent work of 
the OECD. 
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Since the 1998 report, the FHTP has been reviewing preferential 
regimes to ensure they are not harmful.97   All countries that are 
members of the Inclusive Framework are subject to this review.98  As 
of January 2019, the FHTP has reviewed 225 regimes.99  As a result 
of this review, many regimes have been abolished or amended to 
remove features that put them at risk of being declared harmful.100   
Non-tax subsidies are not within the scope of this standard. 
Action 5 provides that “[i]n order for a regime to be considered 
preferential, it must offer some form of tax preference in comparison 
with the general principles of taxation in the relevant country.”101  If 
an incentive is granted as a non-tax subsidy and not as a tax benefit, 
it is not within the scope of this review.   
Where a preferential tax regime is at risk of being considered 
harmful, countries may offer an equivalent non-tax subsidy instead.  
However, unlike harmful tax benefits that are granted without 
requiring commensurate substantial activities in return, 
governments generally grant non-tax subsidies to MNEs for 
substantial activities they carry out in the relevant countries.  For 
example, the Israeli government agreed to grant $1 billion to Intel 
for investing around $11 billion in manufacturing activities within 
the country.102   It is unlikely the Israeli government would have 
agreed to provide this subsidy without Intel’s undertaking of these 
activities in Israel.  In contrast, governments are more likely to 
provide tax benefits to geographically mobile income without 
requiring commensurate substantial activities in return. 103   This 
means governments are generally less likely to replace harmful tax 
 
 97 See id. at 13. 
 98 Id. at 9. 
 99 Id. at 10. 
 100 See id. at 17-32. 
 101 OECD, supra note 58, ¶ 13. 
 102  Alisa Odenheimer, Intel to Invest an Unprecedented $11 Billion in Israel 
Factory, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/intel-to-invest-11-billio
n-in-israel-finance-minister-says. 
 103  For example, a patent box that grants an exemption for income from 
intellectual property has been developed in other jurisdictions.  See generally Fabian 
Gaessler, Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Should There be Lower Taxes on Patent 
Income? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24843, 2019) (indicating 
that certain countries have established special tax treatments, known as patent 
boxes, for corporate income derived from patents to encourage innovation).  Under 
Action 5, BEPS-compliant patent boxes must have a substance requirement (the tax 
benefit is limited to the income attributed to the relevant jurisdiction based on the 
proportionate R&D expenditure in that jurisdiction); OECD, supra note 58, at 24-25. 
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benefits with equivalent non-tax subsidies that do not require 
substantial activities. 
Nonetheless, there is still some risk that some jurisdictions might 
grant subsidies calculated in reference to the MNEs’ tax liability 
without requiring commensurate substantial activities in return.  
For example, instead of granting a tax benefit of $400, a government 
can collect $400 as tax and grant $400 as a non-tax subsidy to offset 
the recipient’s tax liability.  Where subsidies are designed to offset 
the recipients’ tax liability, they could be viewed as tax benefits in 
disguise.  It should also be noted that a failure to require substance 
is only one of the factors in determining whether a regime is 
harmful.104  A tax incentive scheme might be classified as harmful if 
it is ring-fenced from the domestic economy, it lacks transparency, 
or if there is no effective exchange of information with respect to the 
regime.  Equivalent non-tax subsidies would not be subject to 
similar scrutiny.  The OECD and some countries may view such 
non-tax subsidies as an attempt to circumvent the international 
standard on harmful tax competition.  However, it is unclear if it is 
possible to take any action against non-tax subsidies within the 
existing framework.105  In addition, there might be an information 
problem—the OECD and other countries may not be able to identify 
and detect instances where countries grant non-tax subsidies instead 
of equivalent harmful tax benefits.  If a non-tax subsidy is not 
required to be reported under other laws, the OECD and other 
countries might not know that a country is engaged in harmful 
subsidy competition.  Discretionary and selective non-tax subsidies 
might be less transparent and harder to monitor.106 
b. EU’s Blacklisting of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions 
In 1997, the EU adopted the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation with the purpose of curbing harmful tax competition 
 
 104 For the list of factors, see OECD, supra note 96, and accompanying text. 
 105 Nonetheless, as noted above, if a subsidy is directly linked to the taxpayer’s 
income or tax liability, there is a higher risk that the OECD will treat the subsidy as 
a tax benefit. 
 106 There might be little or no transparency with respect to how the discretion 
is exercised. 
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among its Member States.107  The Code of Conduct provides that the 
assessment of tax measures to determine whether they are harmful 
should include several factors, such as whether the tax benefits are 
ring-fenced. 108   Tax benefits are ring-fenced when they are only 
available to foreigners or to transactions with foreigners, or the 
benefits are otherwise ring-fenced from the domestic market so that 
the national tax base is unaffected by these tax benefits.109  
In 2016, the EU decided on the criteria and the process that led 
to the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes in 
2017.110  The criteria include whether the jurisdictions comply with 
the international standards on tax transparency, the BEPS minimum 
standards and the EU’s standard of fair taxation.  Under the latter 
criterion, jurisdictions should not have preferential tax measures 
that could be classified as harmful under the Code of Conduct, and 
they “should not facilitate offshore structures or arrangements 
aimed at attracting profits which do not reflect real economic 
activity in the jurisdiction.”111   
 
 107 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting Concerning Taxation Policy, 
1998 O.J. (C2) 1, 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documen
ts/coc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ELE-M3HS]. 
 108 The EU’s list of factors is as follows:  
1. whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of 
transactions carried out with non-residents, or  
2. whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so they 
do not affect the national tax base, or  
3. whether advantages are granted even without any real economic 
activity and substantial economic presence within the Member State 
offering such tax advantages, or  
4. whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within 
a multinational group of companies departs from internationally accepted 
principles, notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD, or 
 5. whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal 
provisions are relaxed at administrative level in a non-transparent way.  
Id. at 3. 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110  Council Conclusions on the Criteria for and Process Leading to the 
Establishment of the EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, 
2016 O.J. (C 461) 2. 
 111 Id. § 2.2. 
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In December 2017, the EU published a list of non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions, which included seventeen non-EU jurisdictions. 112  
Eight of the seventeen jurisdictions that were blacklisted had 
harmful preferential tax regimes as the factor or one of the factors 
that resulted in their blacklisting.113  The EU noted that “effective 
and proportionate defensive measures, in both non-tax and tax areas 
could be applied by the EU and Member States vis-à-vis the non-
cooperative jurisdictions, as long as they are part of such list . . . .”114  
The EU noted that the Member States should increase administrative 
measures targeting the relevant jurisdictions or taxpayers benefiting 
from the relevant regimes.115  It also noted that Member States can 
apply various other defensive measures, such as, inter alia, non-
deductibility of certain expenses, withholding tax measures, stricter 
CFC rules, special documentation and disclosure requirements.116   
The EU’s definition of harmful preferential tax regimes appears 
to be broader than the BEPS Action 5 definition, as made apparent 
by the blacklisting of South Korea.  The EU noted that “Korea has 
harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending 
or abolishing them by 31 December 2018.”117  The blacklisting of 
Korea was particularly surprising because Korea is a G20 and OECD 
member, it has been committed to the implementation of BEPS,118 
and the OECD did not find Korea’s preferential tax regimes to be 
harmful.119  However, it appears that the EU holds a stricter position 
regarding ring-fenced preferential tax regimes that are only 
available to foreign investors.   
The Korean government objected to the EU’s determination that 
its ring-fenced preferential tax regimes for foreign investment 
 
 112 The EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, at 8-9, 2019 O.J. 
(C 438).  These jurisdictions are American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, Grenada, 
Guam, Republic of Korea, Macao SAR, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, 
Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and United Arab 
Emirates.  Id. 
 113  These eight jurisdictions are Barbados, Republic of Korea, Namibia, 
Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia.  See id. 
 114 Id. at 6. 
 115 See id. at 13. 
 116 See id. at 13-14. 
 117 Id. at 8. 
 118 See, e.g., Ted Tae-Gyung Kim, Tax Transparency and Disclosure in Korea, 72 
BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 360 (June 2018).  “Korea has actively participated in the 
implementation of international standards proposed by the OECD.”  Id. at 360. 
 119 See id. at 363 (noting that no harmful tax regimes were found in Korea in a 
recent 2017 review by members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS); OECD, supra 
note 96, ¶ 46. 
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(which include its foreign investment zones and free economic 
zones, available only to foreign investors) are harmful preferential 
tax regimes.120  The Korean government stressed the fact that “the 
EU has expanded the OECD’s BEPS standards to include the 
manufacturing sector,” which goes beyond the OECD application of 
the preferential tax regime standard only to easily mobile activities, 
such as finance and services.121  Although Korea protested that the 
EU’s decision violates Korea’s tax sovereignty because it imposes 
EU standards on non-EU countries,122 Korea decided to yield and 
committed to repealing or amending its preferential tax regimes.  
Following this commitment, the EU removed Korea from the list in 
January 2018. 123   Seven other blacklisted jurisdictions were also 
removed from the list at that time after they made similar 
commitments.124  Korea repealed the ring-fenced tax incentives for 
foreign investors in late 2018.125  
The EU criteria for determining whether a jurisdiction is a non-
cooperative jurisdiction for tax purposes, including the EU 
standards on what would be considered harmful preferential tax 
regimes, do not cover or address non-tax subsidy regimes.  Thus, 
countries can avoid blacklisting by offering ring-fenced non-tax 
subsidy regimes that would be classified as harmful if they were 
granted equivalent tax benefits.  Many countries, such as Korea, 
already offer a mix of various investment incentives, including cash 
 
 120 See Press Release, Ministry of Strategy & Fin. of S. Korea., Government 
Position on EU Announcement of the List of 17 Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions (Dec. 
6, 2017), 
https://english.moef.go.kr/ec/selectTbEconomicDtl.do%3bjsessionid=Y9dRxb3C
FHCcCQWV0+9vYpnW.node10?boardCd=E0003&seq=4403&boardCdKey=N 
[https://perma.cc/TNC2-WYMP] (detailing the reasons for the ministry’s rejection 
of the EU’s determination). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123  European Union Press Release, Taxation: Eight Jurisdictions Removed 
from EU List (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/canada/38654/taxation-eight-jurisdictions-r
emoved-eu-list_en [https://perma.cc/Y4PC-HUDU]. 
 124  Id.  These jurisdictions are Barbados, Grenada, Macao SAR, Mongolia, 
Panama, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
 125  Korea Enacts 2019 Tax Reform Bill, EY GLOBAL (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.ey.com/en_gl/tax-alerts/korea-enacts-2019-tax-reform-bill 
[https://perma.cc/2ZMN-JEE9].  The current EU list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions for tax purposes includes American Samoa, Cayman Islands, Fiji, 
Guam, Oman, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, US Virgin 
Islands, and Vanuatu.  Conclusions on the Revised EU List of Non-Cooperative 
Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, 2020 O.J. (C 64) 8. 
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grants and other non-tax subsidies,126 which could be expanded as 
the ability of these countries to attract foreign investment by offering 
tax incentives becomes more limited. 
V. POLICY ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED CHANGES 
What are the policy implications of this tax-driven preference for 
non-tax subsidies?  This Part analyzes the relevant policy 
considerations.  It also considers how other legal frameworks that 
regulate subsidies—the WTO subsidy rules and the EU state aid 
rules—apply to tax and non-tax subsidies.  Based on this analysis, 
this Article contends that the international tax standards should not 
create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent tax 
benefits.  Following this approach, this Part proposes several 
changes in the international tax standards. 
a. Tax Policy Considerations 
The preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent tax 
subsidies might result in distortions and welfare losses.  Treating 
equivalent non-harmful tax subsidies and non-tax subsidies 
differently could result in suboptimal governmental policies.  A 
recent OECD report on R&D tax and non-tax incentives noted that 
“[a]n optimal policy mix will likely require a combination of both 
direct and indirect [i.e., tax] support instruments.”127  According to 
Weisbach and Nussim, the choice between an equivalent tax 
expenditure and a spending program should depend on which 
agency would optimally administer the scheme.128  The tax-driven 
preference for non-tax subsidies might result in an efficiency cost 
 
 126  See, e.g., FDI Procedures & Incentives, INVEST KOREA (2017), 
http://www.investkorea.org/en/foreigner/invest.do [https://perma.cc/BYX7-
ZQZT]. 
 127 See Silvia Appelt, Fernando Galindo-Rueda & Ana Cinta Gonzalez Carbal, 
Measuring R&D Tax Support: Findings from the New OECD R&D Tax Incentives 
Database 47 (OECD Sci., Tech. & Indus., Working Paper No. 2019/06, 2019), 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/d16e6072-en.pdf?expires=1607966060
&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B3D0B093CAD27BFD955C7583A84E2AD2 
[https://perma.cc/8RQD-VBFZ]. 
 128 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 15, at 957 (arguing that the decision to 
use the tax system to carry out a non-tax program is not a question of tax policy but 
rather one of institutional design). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/3
2020] From Tax Competition to Subsidy Competition 479 
where the optimal instrument is a tax benefit and the optimal choice 
is distorted by the tax-driven preference for non-tax subsidies. 
Welfare losses may occur where non-harmful tax benefits that 
increase welfare cannot be replaced with equivalent non-tax 
subsidies, or where they can be replaced but at a high cost.  For 
example, assume that a government offers non-harmful investment 
tax benefits that increase the national welfare in the relevant 
country.129  As discussed in the previous Parts, recent international 
tax reforms make these tax incentives less attractive for MNEs.  
There should be no welfare loss if the government can replace the 
tax benefits with equivalent non-tax subsidies with no additional 
cost.  However, some governments may not be able to easily replace 
tax incentives with equivalent non-tax subsidies.  This might be the 
result of budgetary rules that impose more restrictions on non-tax 
subsidies or political economy considerations.  Welfare losses might 
occur where welfare-increasing tax benefits become less attractive 
and they cannot be replaced with equivalent non-tax subsidies.   
On the other hand, where tax incentives decrease the national 
welfare,130 there may be a welfare gain if the tax benefits become less 
attractive and they are not replaced with equivalent subsidies.  This 
could lead to the repeal of such inefficient tax incentives or to a 
decrease in the uptake of such incentives.  As we expect that some 
tax incentive programs are efficient and some are not, the impact 
should be mixed.  However, even if some tax incentive schemes are 
suboptimal, it is unclear whether the international tax norms should 
disfavor both optimal and suboptimal tax benefits as a way to 
reduce the use of the suboptimal ones. 
With respect to harmful preferential tax regimes, some countries 
might replace such tax benefits with equivalent harmful non-tax 
subsidies as discussed in Part IV.  As discussed above, it is unlikely 
that governments will replace harmful tax incentives that do not 
require economic substance with equivalent subsidies.  However, 
there is some risk that some governments might grant subsidies 
designed to offset the recipients’ tax liability without requiring 
commensurate substantial activities in return.  Countries may also 
offer ring-fenced non-tax subsidies that the EU and other countries 
might find problematic if equivalent tax benefits were granted.   
 
 129  This may be the case where the investment incentives substantially 
increase foreign direct investment and employment, resulting in domestic 
spillovers. 
 130  This would be the case if the cost of the incentive regime exceeds the 
resulting benefits. 
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Another consideration concerns the transparency of equivalent 
tax incentives and non-tax subsidies.  The BEPS standards 
substantially increase the transparency of tax incentives, as tax 
rulings must be exchanged under Action 5, and even in the absence 
of a reportable tax ruling, a CbC report would show if an MNE paid 
no or low tax in a particular jurisdiction.  Equivalent non-tax 
subsidies would be less transparent if the disclosure is not required 
under other laws. 131   In most cases, where a non-tax subsidy is 
granted for substantial activities in the relevant jurisdiction, other 
jurisdictions are unlikely to be harmed by the lack of transparency.  
However, if some countries adopt subsidies designed to offset the 
recipients’ tax liability (which effectively makes them tax subsidies 
in disguise), then the lack of transparency becomes problematic.  
From an EU standpoint, the lack of transparency concerning ring-
fenced subsidies might be problematic.  To address these issues, it is 
possible to require the disclosure of potentially harmful non-tax 
subsidies where the disclosure of equivalent tax benefits is required.   
Additionally, different tax treatment for equivalent tax benefits 
and non-tax subsidies might be inconsistent with the principle of tax 
fairness (i.e., horizontal equity), which is the notion that the tax 
system should treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly.132   As 
shown in this Article, an MNE that receives a non-tax subsidy would 
have an advantage over an MNE that receives an equivalent tax 
benefit.  As these measures are equivalent, these two MNEs are 
similarly situated and should be treated similarly under the tax 
system.  Therefore, following the principle of tax fairness would 
require treating MNEs that receive equivalent tax and non-tax 
incentives similarly.   
Therefore, this Article argues that the international tax standards 
should not create a preference for non-tax subsidies over equivalent 
tax benefits.  A framework that treats equivalent tax and non-tax 
subsidies similarly would be more efficient for the reasons discussed 
above.  Also, it would be consistent with the principle of horizontal 
equity and would improve transparency.   
This approach is similar to the approach adopted in the WTO 
subsidy rules and the EU state aid rules, as these legal frameworks 
 
 131 Disclosure of certain subsidies may be required under domestic law, the 
WTO subsidy rules, and the EU state aid rules.  See sources cited supra note 60 
(describing Commission regulations and WTO rules governing disclosure of certain 
subsidies).  However, many subsidies might not fall within the scope of these rules. 
 132 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 
(2008), and the literature reviewed there on horizontal equity. 
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generally treat equivalent tax and non-tax subsidies similarly.  
Under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, a subsidy exists where a benefit is conferred through a 
financial contribution by a government or a public body, or through 
any form of income or price support.133  Financial contribution is 
defined broadly, and it includes “government revenue that is 
otherwise due [that] is foregone or not collected [e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits].”134  Hence, the WTO rules generally 
apply to subsidies irrespective of whether they are provided as tax 
benefits, grants, or other forms of financial contribution.  The EU 
rules on state aid apply to aid measures “in any form 
whatsoever,”135 including tax measures.136  In general, a tax measure 
is considered an “aid” if it reduces the firm’s tax burden, it is granted 
through state resources (including as a loss of tax revenue), it affects 
competition and trade between the EU Member States, and it is 
specific or selective.137  Under these rules, subsidies and equivalent 
 
 133 WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1.  
 134  See id. (footnote omitted). Under art. 1.1(a)(1), “financial contribution” 
exists where: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(e.g. loan guarantees);  
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);  
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods;  
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts 
or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments.  
Id. 
 135 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 107(1), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 91. 
 136  Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures 
Relating to Direct Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 384) ¶ 8, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/g_15_01_1
4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M4J-QXHX] (“In applying the Community rules on 
State aid, it is irrelevant whether the measure is a tax measure, since Article 92 [now 
107] applies to aid measures ‘in any form whatsoever.’”).  For further discussion, 
see Sandra Marco Colino, The Long Arm of State Aid Law: Crushing Corporate Tax 
Avoidance, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
 137 See Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures 
Relating to Direct Business Taxation, supra note 137, ¶ 16.  To be considered as aid, 
the measure should be “an exception to the application of the tax system.”  Id.  
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tax measures should generally be subject to similar treatment.  Thus, 
the WTO rules on subsidies and the EU rules on state aid generally 
treat tax incentives and other subsidies similarly.   
b. Proposed Changes in the International Tax Standards 
The discussion below sets forth several proposals for changes in 
the international tax standards to achieve similar treatment of 
equivalent tax benefits and non-tax subsidies.  If policymakers 
accept the principle that equivalent tax incentives and non-tax 
subsidies should be treated similarly, the implementation details of 
these proposals could be further developed. 
i. CbC Reports 
As discussed in Section III.a, non-harmful tax incentives 
negatively affect the CbC report because the tax liability and the 
effective tax rate are lower in comparison to a CbC report of an MNE 
that receives a non-tax subsidy and pays tax on the income in the 
relevant jurisdiction.  This could be addressed by disclosing in an 
additional column in the CbC report the estimated income tax that 
would apply if a non-harmful tax benefit were granted as an 
equivalent non-tax subsidy.  For example, assume that the tax 
incentive schemes in a particular country were found to be non-
harmful.  If these tax incentives were replaced with equivalent non-
tax subsidies, then the tax liability in that country would have been 
higher as demonstrated in Section III.a.  The proposed additional 
column would report that simulated tax liability.  To implement this 
proposal, there should be guidance on how to quantify the tax 
subsidy and calculate the simulated tax liability.138  This additional 
information can assist tax authorities when they review CbC reports 
to conduct risk assessment to identify suspected instances of 
artificial profit shifting.  Providing this additional information could 
reduce the risk that MNEs would be suspected of profit shifting 
 
 138 Among other matters, the guidance should address the following issues: 
what tax rate should be used to quantify the tax subsidy and calculate the simulated 
tax liability on an equivalent subsidy (the jurisdiction’s statutory tax rate, the 
MNE’s effective tax rate or the marginal tax rate) and whether it should be assumed 
that the equivalent non-tax subsidy is subject to tax in the relevant jurisdiction. 
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where the low tax liability is a result of receiving non-harmful tax 
benefits. 
While tax incentives are reflected in the CbC report, equivalent 
non-tax subsidies (including potentially harmful subsidies) are not 
reflected in the CbC report.  This could be addressed by requiring 
the disclosure of subsidies, defined broadly, 139  in an additional 
column in the CbC report.  This information would allow countries 
to inquire whether the subsidies offered by other countries are 
equivalent to harmful tax measures.  This would also enable 
countries and international bodies, such as the OECD, to assess the 
magnitude of the international subsidy competition.  It is possible to 
adopt a narrower disclosure requirement that would only apply to 
subsidies that have certain features which raise the suspicion they 
might be harmful (e.g., subsidies calculated in reference to the 
recipients’ tax position). 
ii. Spontaneous Exchange of Tax Rulings and Scrutiny over 
Harmful Tax Practices 
As noted in Section III.b., under the rules on the spontaneous 
exchange of tax rulings, governments are not subject to a similar 
reporting requirement when they offer subsidy rulings that have the 
same economic effect as reportable tax rulings.  Although countries 
are less likely to grant non-tax subsidies without requiring 
commensurate substantial activities in return, there is some risk that 
some countries might offer subsidies designed to offset the 
recipients’ tax liability.  Such subsidies could be viewed as tax 
benefits in disguise.  This risk can be addressed by requiring the 
spontaneous exchange of information about subsidies calculated 
based on the recipients’ tax position.  This would require expanding 
the “ruling” definition. 140   Similarly, the OECD’s and the EU’s 
scrutiny over harmful tax practices could also include subsidies 
connected to recipients’ tax position or designed to offset the 
recipients’ tax liability. 
 
 139  The subsidy definition for this purpose can follow the WTO’s subsidy 
definition, as discussed in the text accompanying supra note 134. 
 140  As discussed above, the current definition of “ruling” is “any advice 
provided by a tax authority to a specific taxpayer or group of taxpayers concerning 
their tax situation and on which they are entitled to rely.”  See OECD, supra note 58 
and accompanying text. 
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iii. Recommended CFC Rules and the GloBE Proposal 
As discussed in Section III.c., the OECD recommendations for 
CFC rules favor CFCs which receive non-tax subsidies and disfavor 
CFCs that receive equivalent tax benefits.  A CFC that receives a non-
tax subsidy and pays tax is more likely to qualify for a tax rate 
exemption.  Even if the effective tax rate is below the exemption 
threshold, a parent of a CFC that receives a non-tax subsidy and 
pays tax on its income would be able to claim a credit for the tax the 
CFC paid.  A parent of a CFC cannot claim any credit if the CFC 
receives a tax benefit and does not pay tax.   
A similar treatment for non-harmful tax benefits and equivalent 
subsidies can be accomplished by providing carve-outs for non-
harmful tax incentive schemes so that CFC income would not 
include income that benefited from these tax incentives.  
Alternatively, similar to the proposal above concerning the CbC 
reporting, it is possible to take into account, in the application of the 
CFC rules, the simulated income tax that would apply if the tax 
benefits were structured as a non-tax subsidy.  The simulated 
effective tax rate can be used as the CFC’s effective tax rate for the 
purposes of the CFC rules.  In addition, the parent of the CFC should 
be able to use a tax credit based on the CFC’s simulated tax liability. 
Similar issues arise in the context of the OECD’s recent GloBE 
proposal, discussed in Section III.d.  If the GloBE rules are adopted 
without carve-outs for income benefitting from non-harmful tax 
incentives, this would further reduce the benefit from such tax 
incentives and increase the preference for non-tax subsidies.  In 
order to treat equivalent non-harmful tax and non-tax subsidies 
similarly, the GloBE rules could include carve-outs for non-harmful 
tax incentive schemes.  Similarly, when calculating the adjusted 
nominal tax rate when applying the subject to tax rule, this rate 
should not be reduced because of non-harmful preferential tax 
incentives. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The international community has been dealing with the 
challenges of harmful tax competition for decades.  As the efforts to 
curb certain forms of tax competition have intensified in recent 
years, it is important to consider the potential impacts of recent 
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international tax reforms on other forms of competition among 
countries. 
This Article makes two contributions to the literature on tax 
policy and international economic law.  First, it shows how recent 
international tax reforms encourage the adoption of non-tax 
subsidies over equivalent tax incentives.  Second, the Article 
analyzes the policy considerations and implications of the tax-
driven preference for non-tax subsidies.  Based on this analysis, the 
Article recommends that the international tax standards be 
amended so they would treat equivalent tax and non-tax incentives 
similarly.  The Article also outlines several changes in the 
international tax standards that could advance this goal.  
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